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Abstract
Nash equilibrium is a popular solution concept for
solving imperfect-information games in practice.
However, it has a major drawback: it does not pre-
clude suboptimal play in branches of the game tree
that are not reached in equilibrium. Equilibrium
refinements can mend this issue, but have experi-
enced little practical adoption. This is largely due
to a lack of scalable algorithms.
Sparse iterative methods, in particular first-order
methods, are known to be among the most ef-
fective algorithms for computing Nash equilibria
in large-scale two-player zero-sum extensive-form
games. In this paper, we provide, to our knowledge,
the first extension of these methods to equilibrium
refinements. We develop a smoothing approach
for behavioral perturbations of the convex poly-
tope that encompasses the strategy spaces of play-
ers in an extensive-form game. This enables one
to compute an approximate variant of extensive-
form perfect equilibria. Experiments show that our
smoothing approach leads to solutions with dramat-
ically stronger strategies at information sets that
are reached with low probability in approximate
Nash equilibria, while retaining the overall con-
vergence rate associated with fast algorithms for
Nash equilibrium. This has benefits both in ap-
proximate equilibrium finding (such approximation
is necessary in practice in large games) where some
probabilities are low while possibly heading toward
zero in the limit, and exact equilibrium computa-
tion where the low probabilities are actually zero.
1 Introduction
Nash equilibrium is the basic solution concept for nonco-
operative games, including extensive-form games (EFGs), a
broad class of games that model sequential and simultane-
ous interaction, imperfect information, and outcome uncer-
tainty [Sandholm, 2010; Bowling et al., 2015; Brown et al.,
2015; Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017]. Nash equilibrium was the
solution concept used in the Libratus agent, which showed
superhuman performance against a team of top Heads-Up
No-Limit Texas hold’em poker specialist professional play-
ers in the Brains vs. AI event in January 2017 [Brown and
Sandholm, 2017a]. It was also used in the DeepStack agent
[Moravcˇı´k et al., 2017], which beat a group of professional
players. It has also been dominant in the Annual Computer
Poker Competition [ACPC], where the winning agents have
all been based on Nash equilibrium approximation for many
years.
In spite of this popularity, Nash equilibria suffer from a ma-
jor deficiency: they might not play reasonably in parts of the
game tree that are reached with zero probability in equilib-
rium. In particular, the only guarantee that Nash equilibrium
gives in these parts of the game tree is that it does not give
up more utility than the value of the game. Thus, if the oppo-
nent makes a big mistake, Nash equilibrium might give back
all the utility gained from the opponent making that mistake,
since it is only maintaining the value of the game (Miltersen
and Sørensen [2010] show nice examples of such behavior).
The above shows that Nash equilibrium is not satisfac-
tory in extensive-form games, and is the motivation for equi-
librium refinements [Selten, 1975]. When information is
perfect, the classical solution concept of subgame-perfect
equilibrium (SPE) can be satisfactory, while it is not when
information is imperfect. In this latter case, refinements
are usually based on the idea of perturbations represent-
ing mistakes of the players. In a quasi-perfect equilibrium
(QPE) [van Damme, 1984], a player maximizes her utility
in each decision node taking into account the future mis-
takes of the opponents only, whereas, in an extensive-form
perfect equilibrium (EFPE), players maximize their utility
in each decision node taking into account the future mis-
takes of both themselves and their opponents [Selten, 1975;
Hillas and Kohlberg, 2002].
Computation of Nash equilibrium refinements in EFGs
has received some attention in the literature. Von Sten-
gel et. al. [2002] give a pivoting algorithm for comput-
ing normal-form-perfect equilibria in EFGs. Miltersen and
Sørensen [2010] give an algorithm for computing quasi-
perfect equilibria. Miltersen and Sørensen [2008] show how
to compute a normal-form-proper equilibrium. Farina and
Gatti [2017] give an algorithm for computing extensive-form
perfect equilibria. All these results rely on linear program-
ming (LP) (in the zero-sum case) or linear complementary
programming (LCP). In zero-sum games, several of these
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solution concepts can be computed in polynomial time us-
ing an LP or a series of LPs. However, even for the eas-
ier case of Nash equilibria, the LP approach is not scal-
able for large games (beyond roughly 108 nodes in the game
tree [Gilpin and Sandholm, 2007]). Each iteration of an LP-
solving algorithm is expensive, and the LP might even be
too large to fit in memory. In practice, iterative methods
are preferred, even for games of modest size. These meth-
ods have iteration costs that are usually linear, or better, in
the game size, but converge to a Nash equilibrium only in
the limit. The most prominent of these methods are coun-
terfactual regret minimization (CFR) [Zinkevich et al., 2007]
and its variants [Lanctot et al., 2009; Tammelin et al., 2015;
Brown and Sandholm, 2015; Brown and Sandholm, 2017b],
and general first-order methods (FOMs) such as the exces-
sive gap technique (EGT) [Nesterov, 2005a] instantiated with
an appropriate EFG smoothing technique [Hoda et al., 2010;
Kroer et al., 2015; Kroer et al., 2017]. Farina et al. [2017]
show how to extend CFR to approximate EFPEs.
In this paper, we show how to extend FOMs to the com-
putation of an approximate variant of EFPE. Miltersen and
Sørensen [2010] and Farina and Gatti [2017] presented per-
turbed polytopes of EFGs that capture equilibrium refine-
ments where each action has to be played with positive prob-
ability. We prove that recent results on smoothing techniques
for EFGs based on dilating the entropy function can be modi-
fied to provide smoothing for such perturbed games, where
the perturbations are with respect to behavioral strategies.
We then instantiate this method for the perturbed game of
Farina and Gatti, which leads to our approximate EFPE.
We then experimentally validate our method. We show
that it is effective at obtaining low maximum regret at each
information set of the game—even ones that have low proba-
bility of being reached—while simultaneously achieving the
same practical convergence rate that FOMs and the best CFR
variants traditionally achieve for just Nash equilibrium. This
has benefits both in approximate Nash equilibrium finding
(such approximation is necessary in practice in large games)
where some probabilities are low while possibly heading to-
ward zero in the limit, and exact Nash equilibrium computa-
tion where the low probabilities are actually zero.
2 Preliminaries
We assume that the reader is familiar with the classical con-
cept of extensive-form game. We invite the reader unfamiliar
with the topic to refer to Shoham and Leyton-Brown [2008]
or any classic textbook on the subject for further information
and context. Briefly, an extensive-form game Γ is defined
over a game tree. In each non-terminal node a single player
moves and each edge corresponds to an action available to
the player. Each leaf node is associated with a payoff vector,
representing the utility for the two players when the game fin-
ishes in the leaf.
A Nash equilibrium is defined in Definition 2.
Definition 1. An -NE is a strategy profile (pi1, pi2) for the
players, such that no player can gain more than  by unilat-
erally deviating from their strategy.
Definition 2. A Nash equilibrium (NE) is a 0-NE.
However, Nash equilibria might not be satisfactory when
dealing with EFGs, independently of whether the game has
perfect or imperfect information, and whether it is general-
or zero-sum. A Nash equilibrium pi might prescribe irra-
tional play in those information sets that are visited with
zero probability when playing according to pi (e.g., [Miltersen
and Sørensen, 2008]). In the general-sum case, consider the
left example of Figure 1: the strategy profile (pi1, pi2) where
player 1 always chooses action x and player 2 always chooses
action y is a NE. However, this strategy profile is irrational:
Player 2 is “threatening” to play a suboptimal action, and
Player 1 is caving in to the threat. Yet, the threat is not cred-
ible: if Player 1 were to actually play action y, it would be
irrational for Player 2 to honor the threat.
Player 1
(1, 5)
x y
Player 2
(5, 1) (0, 0)
x y
Player 1
(1,−1)
x y
Player 2
(−5, 5) (0, 0)
x y
Figure 1: General-sum (left) and zero-sum (right) games where
Nash equilibrium prescribes irrational play. Numbers in parenthe-
ses denote the payoffs to Players 1 and 2.
The right example in Figure 1 shows that even in zero-sum
games, a NE can fail to capture (sequential) rationality. In
this game, the same strategy profile as in the previous game
is again a NE. If Player 2 plays according to this profile, she
gives up a potential payoff of 5 if Player 1 plays action y.
2.1 Perturbations and Extensive-Form Perfection
A way to mend the issue just described is to introduce the idea
of “trembling hands”: each player cannot fully commit to a
pure strategy, and ends up making mistakes with a small (yet
strictly positive) probability. This guarantees that the whole
game tree gets visited. More formally, let l(h, a) be the per-
turbation of the game, a (positive) function defining the mini-
mum amount of probability mass with which the player play-
ing at information set h in the game will select action a when
playing in h. Let Γl be the game where players are subject to
such perturbation: an extensive-form perfect equilibrium of
the game Γ is any limit point of the sequence of Nash equi-
libria of the game Γl, as l vanishes [Selten, 1975]. In this
paper, we deal with the simplest form of perturbation – a uni-
form perturbation lξ for ξ > 0, defined as lξ(h, a) = ξ for all
a and h. We will denote the game Γlξ as Γξ.
2.2 Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems and the
Sequence Form
It is well-known that the strategy spaces of an extensive-
form game can be transformed into convex polytopes that
allow a bilinear saddle-point formulation (BSPP) of the
Nash equilibrium problem as follows [Romanovskii, 1962;
von Stengel, 1996; Koller et al., 1996].
min
x∈X
max
y∈Y
〈x,Ay〉 = max
y∈Y
min
x∈X
〈x,Ay〉 (1)
Our approach for computing equilibrium refinements will be
based on constructing a perturbed variant of X and Y .
Several FOMs with attractive convergence properties have
been introduced for BSPPs [Nesterov, 2005b; Nesterov,
2005a; Nemirovski, 2004; Chambolle and Pock, 2011].
These methods rely on having some appropriate distance
measure over X and Y , called a distance-generating function
(DGF). Generally, FOMs use the DGF to choose steps: given
a gradient and a scalar stepsize, a FOM moves in the neg-
ative gradient direction by finding the point that minimizes
the sum of the gradient and of the DGF evaluated at the new
point. In other words, the next step can be found by solving a
regularized optimization problem, where long gradient steps
are discouraged by the DGF. For EGT on EFGs, the DGF can
be interpreted as a smoothing function applied to the best-
response problems faced by the players.
Definition 3. A distance-generating function for X is a func-
tion d(x) : X → R which is convex and continuous on
X , admits continuous selection of subgradients on the set
X ◦ = {x ∈ X : ∂d(x) 6= ∅}, and is strongly convex modulus
ϕ w.r.t. ‖·‖. Distance-generating functions for Y are defined
analogously.
Given a twice differentiable function f , we let∇2f(z) de-
note its Hessian at z. Our analysis is based on the following
sufficient condition for strong convexity of a twice differen-
tiable function:
Fact 1. A twice-differentiable function f is strongly convex
with modulus ϕ with respect to a norm ‖·‖ on nonempty con-
vex set C ⊂ Rn if h>∇2f(z)h ≥ ϕ‖h‖, ∀h ∈ Rn, z ∈ C◦.
Given DGFs dX , dY for X ,Y with strong convexity mod-
uli ϕX and ϕY respectively, we now describe the Excessive
Gap Technique (EGT) [Nesterov, 2005a] applied to (1). EGT
forms two smoothed functions using the DGFs
fµy (x) = max
y∈Y
〈x,Ay〉 − µYdY , (2)
φµx(y) = min
x∈X
〈x,Ay〉+ µXdX . (3)
These functions are smoothed approximations to the opti-
mization problem faced by the x and y player, respectively.
The scalars µ1, µ2 > 0 are smoothness parameters denoting
the amount of smoothing applied. Let yµ2(x) and xµ1(y) re-
fer to the y and x values attaining the optima in (2) and (3).
These can be thought of as smoothed best responses. Nes-
terov [2005b] shows that the gradients of the functions fµ2(x)
and φµ1(y) exist and are Lipschitz continuous. The gradient
operators and Lipschitz constants are given as follows
∇fµ2(x) = a1 +Ayµ2(x), ∇φµ1(y) = a2 +A>xµ1(y),
L1 (fµ2) =
‖A‖2
ϕYµ2
and L2 (φµ1) =
‖A‖2
ϕXµ1
.
Let the convex conjugate of d : Q → R be denoted by
d∗(q) = maxq∈Q gT q − d(q). Based on this setup, we for-
mally state EGT [Nesterov, 2005a] as Algorithm 1.
The EGT algorithm alternates between taking steps fo-
cused on X and Y . Algorithm 2 shows a single step focused
on X . Steps focused on y are analogous. Algorithm 1 shows
how the alternating steps and stepsizes are computed, as well
as how initial points are selected.
Suppose the initial values µ1, µ2 satisfy µ1 = ϕXL1(fµ2 ) . Then,
at every iteration t ≥ 1 of EGT, the corresponding solution
2.2 Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems and the
Sequence Form
It is well-known that the strategy spaces of an extensive-
form game can be transformed into convex polytopes that
allow a bilinear saddle-point formulation (BSPP) of the
Nash equilibrium problem as follows [Romanovskii, 1962;
von Stengel, 1996; Koller et al., 1996]
min
x2X
max
y2Y
hx,Ayi = max
y2Y
min
x2X
hx,Ayi. (1)
Our approach for computing equilibrium refinements will be
based on constructing a perturbed variant of X and Y .
Given a BSPP, several first-order methods with attrac-
tive convergence properties have been introduced [Nesterov,
2005b; 2005a; Nemirovski, 2004; Chambolle and Pock,
2011]. However, these methods all rely on having some ap-
propriate distance measure over X and Y , called a distance-
generating function .
Defi ition 3. A distance-generating function for X is a func-
tion d(x) : X ! R wh ch is convex and continuous on
X , admits continuous selection of subgradients on the set
X   = {x 2 X : @d(x) 6= ;}, and is strongly convex modu-
lus ' w.r.t. k·k:
8x0, x00 2 X   : hd0(x0)  d0(x00), x0   x00i   'kx0   x00k2.
(2)
Distance-generating functions for Y are defined analogously.
Given a twice differentiable function f , we letr2f(z) de-
note its Hessian at z. Our analysis is based on the following
sufficient condition for strong convexity of a twice differen-
tiable function:
Fact 1. A twice-differentiable function f is strongly convex
with modulus ' with respect to a no m k·k on non mpty con-
vex set C ⇢ Rn if h> 2f(z)h   'khk, 8h 2 Rn, z 2 C .
Given DGFs dX , dY for X ,Y with strong convexity modu-
lus 'X ,'Y , we now describe EGT [Nesterov, 2005a] applied
to (1). EGT forms two smoothed functions using the DGFs
fµy (x) = max
y2Y
hx,Ayi   µYdY , (3)
 µx(y) = min
x2X
hx,Ayi+ µXdX . (4)
These functions are smoothed approximations to the opti-
mization problem faced by the x and y player respectively.
The scalars µ1, µ2 > 0 are smoothness parameters denoting
the amount of smoothing applied. Let yµ2(x) and xµ1(y) re-
fer to the y and x values attaining the optima in (3) and (4).
These can be thought of as smoo d best responses. Nes-
terov [Nesterov, 2005b] shows that the gradients of the func-
tions fµ2(x) and  µ1(y) exist and are Lipschitz continuous.
The gradient operators and Lipschitz constants are given as
follows
rfµ2(x) = a1 +Ayµ2(x), r µ1(y) = a2 +A>xµ1(y),
L1 (fµ2) =
kAk2
'Yµ2
and L2 ( µ1) =
kAk2
'Xµ1
.
Let d⇤ denote the convex conjugate of d. Bas d n this
setup, we formally state EGT [Nesterov, 2005a] in Algo-
rithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: EGT
input : !-center z! , DGF weights µ1, µ2, and ✏ > 0
output: zt(= [xt; yt])
x0 = rd⇤X
 
µ 11 rfµ2(x!)
 
, y0 = yµ2(x!);
t = 0; z1 := z!;
while ✏sad(zt) > ✏ do
⌧t =
2
t+3 ;
if t is even then
(µt+11 , x
t+1, yt+1) = Step(µt1, µ
t
2, x
t, yt, ⌧)
else
(µt+12 , y
t+1, xt+1) = Step(µt2, µ
t
1, y
t, xt, ⌧)
t = t+ 1;
ALGORITHM 2: Step
input : µ1, µ2, x, y, ⌧
output: µ+1 , x+, y+
xˆ = (1  ⌧)x+ ⌧xµ1(y), y+ = (1  ⌧) y + ⌧yµ2(xˆ);
x˜ = Proxxµ1 (y)
⇣
⌧
(1 ⌧)µ1rfµ2(xˆ)
⌘
;
x+ = (1  ⌧)x+ ⌧ x˜;
µ+1 = (1  ⌧)µ1;
The EGT algorithm alternates between taking steps fo-
cused on X and Y . Algorithm 2 shows a single step focused
on X . Steps focused on y are completely analogous. Al-
gorithm 1 shows how the alternating steps and stepsizes are
computed, as well as how initial points are selected.
Suppose the initial values µ1, µ2 in the EGT algorithm sat-
isfy µ1 = 'XL1(fµ2 ) . Then, at every iteration t   1 of the EGT
algorithm, the corresponding solution zt = [xt; yt] satisfies
xt 2 X , yt 2 Y , and
f(xt)   (yt) = ✏sad(zt)  4kAk
T + 1
s
⌦X⌦Y
'X'Y
.
Consequently, [Nesterov, 2005a] proves that the EGT algo-
rithm has a convergence rate of O( 1⇠ ).
2.3 Treeplexes
Hoda et al. [2010] introduce the treeplex, a class of convex
polytopes that encompass the sequence-form description of
strategy spaces in perfect-recall EFGs.
Definition 4. Treeplexes are defined recursively:
1. Basic sets: The standard simplex  m is a treeplex.
2. Cartesian product: If Q1, . . . , Qk are treeplexes, then
Q1 ⇥ · · ·⇥Qk is a treeplex.
3. Branching: Given a treeplex P ✓ [0, 1]p, a collection of
treeplexesQ = {Q1, . . . , Qk} whereQj ✓ [0, 1]nj , and
l = {l1, . . . , lk} ✓ {1, . . . , p}, the set defined by
P l Q :=
n
(x, y1, . . . , yk) 2 Rp+
P
j nj : x 2 P,
y1 2 xl1 ·Q1, . . . , yk 2 xlk ·Qk
o
2.2 Bilinear Saddle-Point Problems and the
Sequence Form
It is well-known that the strategy spaces of an extensive-
form game can be transformed into convex polytopes that
allow a bilinear saddle-point formulation (BSPP) of the
Nash equilibrium problem as follows [Romanovskii, 1962;
von Stengel, 1996; Koller et al., 1996].
min
x2X
max
y2Y
hx,Ayi = max
y2Y
min
x2X
hx,Ayi (1)
Our approach for computing equilibrium refinements will be
based o constructing perturbed variant of X and Y .
Several first-order methods with attractive convergence
properties have been introduced for BSPPs [Nesterov, 2005b;
2005a; Nemirovski, 2004; Chambolle and Pock, 2011]. How-
ever, these methods all rely on having some appropriate dis-
tance measure over X and Y , called a distance-generating
function. Generally, FOMs use the DGF to choose steps:
given a gradient and a scalar stepsize, a FOM moves in the
negative gradient direction by finding the point that mini-
mizes the su of the radient and of the DGF evaluat d at the
new point. For EGT on EFGs, the DGF can be interpreted as
a smoothing function applied to the best-response problems
faced by the players.
Definition 3. A distance-generating function for X is a func-
tion d(x) : X ! R which is convex and continuous on
X , admits continuous selection of subgradients on the set
X   = {x 2 X : @d(x) 6= ;}, and is strongly convex modulus
' w.r.t. k·k. Distance-generating functions for Y are defined
analogously.
Given a twice ifferentiable function f , we letr2f(z) de-
note its Hessian at z. Our analysis is based on the following
sufficient condition for s r g convexity of a twice differen-
tiable function:
Fact 1. A twice-differenti ble function f is strongly convex
with modulus ' with re pect to a norm k·k on non mpty co -
vex set C ⇢ Rn if h>r2f(z)   'khk, 8h 2 Rn, z 2 C .
Given DGFs dX , dY for X ,Y with strong convexity mod-
uli 'X and 'Y respectiv ly, we w describe the Exc ssive
Gap Technique (EGT) [Nesterov, 2005a] applied to (1). EGT
forms two smoothed functions using the DGFs
fµy (x) = max
y2Y
hx,Ayi   µYdY , (2)
 µx(y) = min
x2X
hx,Ayi+ µXdX . (3)
These functions are smoothed approximations to the opti-
mization problem faced by the x and y player, respectively.
The scalars µ1, µ2 > 0 are smoothness parameters denoting
the amount of smoothing applied. Let yµ2(x) and xµ1(y) re-
fer to the y and x values attaining the optima in (2) and (3).
These can be thought of as smoothed best responses. Nes-
terov [2005b] shows that the gradients of the functions fµ2(x)
and  µ1(y) exist and are Lipschitz continuous. The gradient
operators and Lipschitz constants are given as follows
rfµ2(x) = a1 +Ayµ2(x), r µ1(y) = a2 +A>xµ1(y),
L1 (fµ2) =
kAk2
'Yµ2
and L2 ( µ1) =
kAk2
'Xµ1
.
Let d⇤ denote the convex conjugate of d. Based on this
setup, we formally state EGT [Nesterov, 2005a] as Algo-
rithm 1.
ALGORITHM 1: EGT
input : !-center z! , DGF weights µ1, µ2, and ✏ > 0
output: zt(= [xt; yt])
x0 = rd⇤X
 
µ 11 rfµ2(x!)
 
, y0 = yµ2(x!);
t = 0; z1 := z!;
while ✏sad(zt) > ✏ do
⌧t =
2
t+3 ;
if t is even then
(µt+11 , x
t+1, yt+1) = Step(µt1, µ
t
2, x
t, yt, ⌧)
else
(µt+12 , y
t+1, xt+1) = Step(µt2, µ
t
1, y
t, xt, ⌧)
t = t+ 1;
ALGORITHM 2: Step
input : µ1, µ2, x, y, ⌧
output: µ+, x+, y+
xˆ = (1  ⌧)x+ ⌧xµ1(y), y+ = (1  ⌧) y + ⌧yµ2(xˆ);
x˜ rd⇤X
⇣
rdX (xµ1(y))  ⌧(1 ⌧)µ1rfµ2(xˆ)
⌘
;
+ = (1  ⌧)x+ ⌧ x˜;
µ+1 µ1;
The EGT algorithm alternates between taking steps fo-
cused on X and Y . Algorithm 2 shows a single step focused
on X . Steps focused on y are analogous. Algorithm 1 shows
how the alternating steps and stepsizes are computed, as well
as how initial points are selected.
Suppose the initial values µ1, µ2 in EGT satisfy µ1 =
'X
L1(fµ2 )
. Then, at every iteration t   1 of EGT, the corre-
sponding solution zt = [xt; yt] satisfies xt 2 X , yt 2 Y ,
and
max
y2Y
(xt)TAy  min
x2X
xTAyt = ✏sad(z
t)  4kAk
T + 1
s
⌦X⌦Y
'X'Y
.
Consequently, EGT has a convergence rate of O( 1⇠ ) [Nes-
terov, 2005a].
2.3 Treeplexes
Hoda et al. [2010] introduce the treeplex, a class of con-
vex polytopes that captures the sequence-form of the strategy
spaces in perfect-recall EFGs.
Definition 4. Treeplexes are defined recursively:
1. Basic sets: The standard simplex  m s a treeplex.
2. Cartesian product: If Q1, . . . , Qk are treeplexes, then
Q1 ⇥ · · ·⇥Qk is a treeplex.
3. Branching: Given a treeplex P ✓ [0, 1]p, a collection of
treeplexesQ = {Q1, . . . , Qk} whereQj ✓ [0, 1]nj , and
zt = [xt; yt] satisfies xt ∈ X , yt ∈ Y , and
max
y∈Y
(xt)TAy −min
x∈X
xTAyt = sad(z
t) ≤ 4‖A‖
T + 1
√
ΩXΩY
ϕXϕY
.
Consequently, EGT has a convergence rate of O( 1 ) [Nes-
terov, 2005a].
2.3 Treeplexes
Hoda et al. [2010] introduce the treeplex, a class of con-
vex polytopes that captures the sequence-form of the strategy
spaces in perfect-recall EFGs.
Definition 4. Treeplexes are defined recursively:
1. Basic sets: The standard simplex ∆m is a treeplex.
2. Cartesian product: If Q1, . . . , Qk are treeplexes, then
Q1 × · · · ×Qk is a treeplex.
3. Branching: Given a treeplex P ⊆ [0, 1]p, a collection of
treeplexesQ = {Q1, . . . , Qk} whereQj ⊆ [0, 1] j , and
l = {l1, . . . , lk} ⊆ {1, . . . , p}, the set defined by
P l Q :=
{
(x, y1, . . . , yk) ∈ Rp+
∑
j nj : x ∈ P,
y1 ∈ xl1 ·Q1, . . . , yk ∈ xlk ·Qk
}
is a treeplex. We say xlj is the branching variable for
the treeplex Qj .
For a treeplex Q, we denote by SQ the index set of the set
of simplexes contained in Q (in an EFG SQ is the set of in-
formation sets belonging to the player). For each j ∈ SQ, the
treeplex rooted at the j-th simplex ∆j is referred to as Qj .
Given vector q ∈ Q and simplex ∆j , we let Ij denote the
set of indices of q that correspond to the variables in ∆j and
define qj to be the subvector of q corresponding to the vari-
ables in Ij . For each simplex ∆j and branch i ∈ Ij , the set
Dij represents the set of indices of simplexes reached imme-
diately after ∆j by taking branch i (in an EFG, Dij is the set
of potential next-step information sets for the player). Given
a vector q ∈ Q, simplex ∆j , and index i ∈ Ij , each child sim-
plex ∆k for every k ∈ Dij is scaled by qi. For a given simplex
∆j , we let pj denote the index in q of the parent branching
variable qpj scaling ∆
j . We use the convention that qpj = 1
if Q is such that no branching operation precedes ∆j . For
each j ∈ SQ, dj is the maximum depth of the treeplex rooted
at ∆j , that is, the maximum number of simplexes reachable
through a series of branching operations at ∆j . Then dQ gives
the depth of Q. We use bjQ to identify the number of branch-
ing operations preceding the j-th simplex in Q. We say that a
simplex j such that bjQ = 0 is a root simplex.
Our analysis requires a measure of the size of a treeplex Q.
Thus, we define MQ := maxq∈Q‖q‖1.
In the context of EFGs, supposeQ encodes player 1’s strat-
egy space; then MQ is the maximum number of information
sets with nonzero probability of being reached when player
1 has to follow a pure strategy while the other player may
follow a mixed strategy. We also let
MQ,r := max
q∈Q
∑
j∈SQ:bjQ≤r
‖qj‖1. (4)
Intuitively, MQ,r gives the maximum value of the `1 norm of
any vector q ∈ Q after removing the variables corresponding
to simplexes that are not within r branching operations of the
root of Q.
We letQξ refer to a ξ-perturbed variant of a treeplexQ, for
the perturbed game Γξ. Qξ is the intersection of Q with the
set of constraints qj ≥ ξqpj for all j ∈ SQ. By constructing
perturbed polytopes X ξ,Yξ and using these rather than X ,Y
in (1), we get an approximate variant of EFPEs.
3 Distance-Generating Functions for the
ξ-Perturbed Game
Let ds be a DGF for the n-dimensional simplex ∆n. We
construct a DGF for Q by dilating ds for each simplex in
SQ and take their sum: d(q) =
∑
j∈SQ βjqpjds(
qj
qpj
). This
class of DGFs for treeplexes was introduced by Hoda et.
al. [2010] and has been further studied by Kroer et. al. [2015;
2017]. We show that ds and d can be used to implement
a smoothing function for Qξ and reason about its proper-
ties. To construct a smoothing function for Qξ, we first
construct a smoothing function for an ξ-perturbed simplex
∆ξn = {qs : ‖qs‖1= 1, qs ≥ ξ}, with ξ > 0. We construct
a smoothing function for ∆ξn by composing ds with a simple
affine mapping φ(q˜s) = q˜
s−ξ
1−nξ , which sets up a one-to-one
mapping between ∆n and ∆ξn. The inverse of this function is
φ−1(qs) = (1− nξ)qs + ξ. We let dξs = ds(φ(q˜s)). We will
show that dξs retains all nice DGF properties of ds.
Since ds is continuously differentiable, we can apply the
chain rule to get
∇dξs(qs) = (1− nξ)−1∇ds(q˜s). (5)
For our new DGF to be practical we need the conjugate and its
gradient to be easily computable. We show that this reduces
to a simple transformation of the conjugate of ds:
Lemma 1. For a simplex DGF ds and its ξ-perturbed vari-
ant dξs, the convex conjugate and its gradient for d
ξ
s can be
computed as
dξ,∗s (g) = d
∗
s((1− nξ)g) + 〈g, ξ〉
∇dξ,∗s (g) = (1− nξ)∇d∗s((1− nξ)g) + ξ
Proof. Follows by the definition of conjugate and the chain
rule for gradients.
Thus computing our conjugate reduces to computing the
conjugate for ds coupled with simple linear transformations.
Hoda et. al. [2010] showed that the conjugate for a treeplex
based on a sum over dilated simplex DGFs is easy to com-
pute. Combined with Lemma 1, their result shows that the
conjugate of a treeplex DGF consisting of a sum over dilated
perturbed simplex DGFs is easy to compute, as long as the
same holds for the individual conjugates.
We now focus on the case where ds is the entropy DGF for
a simplex, that is, ds(qs) =
∑
i q
s
i log(q
s
i ). Formally, we get
the following DGF for a perturbed treeplex:
dξQ(q) =
∑
j∈SQ
βjqpj
∑
i∈Ij
qi/qpj − ξ
1− njξj log
(
qi/qpj − ξ
1− njξj
)
Kroer et. al. [2017] showed strong convexity and conver-
gence results for the class of dilated entropy functions for
treeplexes. We now show how their result can be leveraged
to prove strong convexity bounds for the perturbed entropy
DGF.
Theorem 2. The dilated perturbed entropy DGF on a
treeplex with weights that satisfy the following recurrence
αj = 1 + max
i∈Ij
∑
k∈Dij
αkβk
βk − αk , ∀j ∈ SQ,
βj > αj , ∀i ∈ Ij and ∀j ∈ SQ s.t. bjQ > 0,
βj = αj , ∀i ∈ Ij and ∀j ∈ SQ s.t. bjQ = 0.
is strongly convex modulus 1 with respect to the `2 norm and
modulus 1MQ with respect to the `1 norm.
Proof. We will show that the quadratic over the Hessian of
dξQ can be expressed as a constant times the quadratic over the
unperturbed dilated entropy DGF for Q. This will allow us to
invoke the strong convexity theorem of Kroer et. al. [2017].
Consider q ∈ ri (Qξ) and any h ∈ Rn. For each j ∈ SQ
and i ∈ Ij , the second-order partial derivates of dξQ(·) with
respect to qi are:
∇2q2i d
ξ
s(q) =
βj
(1− njξj)(qi − ξqpj )
+
∑
k∈Dij
∑
l∈Ik
βkq
2
l
(1− nkξk)(ql − ξqi)q2i
(6)
Also, for each j ∈ SQ, i ∈ Ij , the second-order partial
derivates with respect to qi, qpj are given by:
∇2qi,qpj d
ξ
s(q) = ∇2qpj ,qid
ξ
s(q) = −
βjqi
(1− njξ)(qi − ξqpj )qpj
.
(7)
Then equations (6) and (7) together imply
h>∇2ω(q)h =
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
[
h2i
(
βj
(1− njξj)(qi − ξqpj )
+
∑
k∈Dij
∑
l∈Ik
βkq
2
l
(1− nkξk)(ql − ξqi)q2i

−hihpj
2βjqi
(1− njξ)(qi − ξqpj )qpj
]
. (8)
Given j ∈ SQ and i ∈ Ij , we have pk = i for each k ∈
Dij and for any k ∈ Dij , there exists some other j′ ∈ SQ
corresponding to k in the outermost summation. Then we
can rearrange the following terms:∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
h2i
∑
k∈Dij
∑
l∈Ik
βkq
2
l
(1− nkξk)(ql − ξqi)q2i
=
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
βj
h2pjq
2
i
(1− njξj)(qi − ξqpj )q2pj
.
Using this equality in (8) leads to
(8) =
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
[
βjh
2
i
(1− njξj)(qi − ξqpj )
+
βjh
2
pjq
2
i
(1− njξj)(qi − ξqpj )q2pj
− 2βjhihpjqi
(1− njξ)(qi − ξqpj )qpj
]
=
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
βjqi
(
h2i
qi
+
h2pj
qi
q2pj
− 2hihpjqpj
)
(1− njξj)(qi − ξqpj )
(9)
Now we can view the three terms inside the brackets as a
convex function of hi. First-order optimality implies that this
function is nonnegative. Furthermore, since qi ≥ ξqpj we
have qiqi−ξqpj ≥ 1. Combined, this gives
(9) ≥
∑
j∈SQ
∑
i∈Ij
βj
(1− njξj)
(
h2i
qi
+
h2pjqi
q2pj
− 2hihpj
qpj
)
≥
∑
j∈SQ
βj
∑
i∈Ij
(
h2i
qi
− 2hihpj
qpj
)
+
h2pj
qpj
 (10)
The last step follows because qiqpj
form simplex weights. By
Lemma 1 in Kroer et. al. [2017] this is exactly the expression
for the quadratic of the Hessian of the unperturbed dilated
entropy function on Q with weights βj . Since our weights
satisfy the requirements in Theorems 1 and 2 of Kroer et. al.,
the unperturbed dilated entropy function with these weights
is strongly convex onQ, and thus we get (10)≥ c‖h‖2 where
c = 1 when ‖·‖ is the l2 norm (by Theorem 1 of Kroer et. al.)
and c = 1MQ when ‖·‖ is the l1 norm (by Theorem 2 of Kroer
et. al.). By Fact 1 this proves our theorem.
Using Theorem 2 we can use the perturbed dilated entropy
function to instantiate EGT. Since the value of the perturbed
entropy on ∆ξn can be lower-bounded by log(n) exactly the
same way as with the unperturbed entropy, we can apply The-
orem 3 of Kroer et. al. [2017], to bound EGT convergence
rate as follows:
Theorem 3. For a perturbed treeplex Qξ, the dilated per-
turbed entropy function with simplex weights βj = MQ(2 +∑dj
r=1 2
r(MQj ,r − 1)) for each j ∈ SQ results in Ωϕ ≤
M2Q2
dQ+2 logm wherem is the dimension of the largest sim-
plex ∆j for j ∈ SQ in the treeplex structure.
Theorem 3 immediately leads to the following convergence
rate result for EGT equipped with dilated perturbed entropy
DGFs to solve perturbed EFGs.
Theorem 4. The EGT algorithm equipped with the di-
lated perturbed entropy DGF with weights βj = 2 +∑dj
r=1 2
r(MXj ,r − 1) for all j ∈ SX and the corresponding
setup for Y will return a -accurate solution to the perturbed
variant of (1) in at most the following number of iterations:(
max
i,j
|Ai,j |
√
M2X 2dX+2M
2
Y2dY+2 logm
)
/,
where the matrix norm is given by:
‖A‖= max
y∈Y
{‖Ay‖∗1: ‖y‖1= 1} = max
i,j
|Ai,j |.
To our knowledge, this is the first result for FOMs that com-
pute an approximate Nash equilibrium refinement.
4 Experiments
We conducted experiments to investigate the practical per-
formance of our smoothing approach when used to instanti-
ate the EGT algorithm. We compare EGT with our smooth-
ing approach to EGT on an unperturbed polytope using the
smoothing technique by Kroer et. al. [2017] and CFR+ [Tam-
melin et al., 2015]. We conducted the experiments on Leduc
hold’em poker [Southey et al., 2005], a widely-used bench-
mark in the imperfect-information game-solving community,
except we tested on a larger variant of the game in order to
better test scalability. In our enlarged version, Leduc 5, the
deck consists of 5 pairs of cards 1 . . . 5, for a total deck size
of 10. Each player initially pays one chip to the pot, and is
dealt a single private card. After a round of betting, a com-
munity card is dealt face up. After a subsequent round of
betting, if neither player has folded, both players reveal their
private cards. If either player pairs their card with the com-
munity card they win the pot. Otherwise, the player with the
highest private card wins. In the event that both players have
the same private card, they draw and split the pot. Kroer et.
al. [2017] point out that the theoretically sound scale at which
the overall weight on the DGF should be set is too conserva-
tive. We tune an overall weight on each DGF by choosing
the weight that performs best with EGT and ξ = 0 among
1, 0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005 on the first 20 iterations. We test our
approach on ξ-perturbed polytopes of the strategy spaces for
ξ ∈ {0.1, 0.05, 0.01, 0.005, 0.001}.
The first experiment measures convergence to Nash equi-
librium (Figure 2). The x-axis shows the number of tree
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Figure 2: Regret as a function of the number of iterations for
EGT with various ⇠ perturbations (denoted in parentheses)
and CFR+. The y-axis is on a log scale.
traversals performed per algorithm. The y-axis shows the sum
of player regrets in the full (unperturbed) game. We find that
the ⇠ perturbations have almost no effect on overall conver-
gence rate until convergence within the perturbed polytope, at
which point the regret in the unperturbed game stops decreas-
ing, as expected. This shows that our approach can be utilized
in practice: there is no substantial loss of convergence rate.
Later in the run once the perturbed algorithms have bottomed
out, there is a tradeoff between exploitability in the full game
and refinement (i.e., better performance in low-probability in-
formation sets).
The second experiment shows a measure of refinement
convergence (Figure 3). The x-axis shows the number of
tree traversals performed per algorithm. The y-axis shows
the maximum regret at any individual information set. Infor-
mation set regret is calculated assuming that the information
set is reached with probability one and applying Bayes’ rule
to get a distribution over nodes at the information set; the re-
gret is the increase in expected utility from best-responding
throughout all information sets in the subtrees rooted at the
information set. Both CFR+ and unperturbed EGT perform
badly with respect to this measure of refinement. Both have
maximum regret two orders of magnitude worse than the
perturbed approach. The maximum regret one can possibly
cause in an information set in Leduc 5 is 22, so CFR+ and
unperturbed EGT also do poorly in that sense.
In contrast to this, we find that our ⇠-perturbed solution
concepts converge to a strategy with low regret at every infor-
mation set. The choice of ⇠ is important: for ⇠ = 0.001, the
smallest perturbation, we see that it takes a long time to con-
verge at low-probability information sets, whereas we con-
verge reasonably quickly for ⇠ = 0.01 or ⇠ = 0.005; for
⇠ = 0.1 and ⇠ = 0.05 the perturbations are too large, and we
end up converging with relatively high regret (due to being
forced to play every action with probability ⇠). Thus, within
this set of experiments, ⇠ 2 [0.005, 0.01] seems to be the ideal
amount of perturbation.
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Figure 2: Regret as a function of the number of iterations for
EGT with various ⇠ perturbations (denoted in parentheses)
and CFR+. The y-axis is on a log scale.
player regrets in the full (unperturbed) game. We find that
the ⇠ perturbations have almost no effect on overall conver-
gence rate until convergence within the perturbed polytope, at
which point the regret in the unperturbed game stops decreas-
ing, as expected. This shows that our approach can be utilized
in practice: there is no substantial loss of convergence rate.
Later in the run once the perturbed algorithms have bottomed
out, there is a tradeoff between exploitability in the full game
and refinement (i.e., better performance in low-probability in-
formation sets).
The second experiment shows a easure f refinement
convergence (Figure 3). The x-axis shows the number of
tree traversals performed per algorithm. The y-axis shows the
maximum regret at any individual information set. Informa-
tion set regret is calculated assuming that the information set
is reached with probability one and applying Bayes rule to get
a distribution over nodes at the information set; the regret is
the increase in expected utility from best-responding through-
out all information sets in the subtrees rooted at the informa-
tion set. Both CFR+ and unperturbed EGT perform badly
with respect to this measure of refinement. Both have maxi-
mum regret two ord rs of magnitude worse than the perturbed
approach. The maximum regret one can possibly cause in an
information set in Leduc 5 is 22, s CFR+ and unperturbed
EGT also do poorly in t at sense.
In contrast to this, we fi d that our ⇠-perturbed solution
concepts converge to a strategy with low regret at every infor-
mation set. The choice of ⇠ is important: for ⇠ = 0.001, the
smallest perturbation, we see that it takes a long time to con-
verge at low-probability information sets, whereas we con-
verge reasonably quickly for ⇠ = 0.01 or ⇠ = 0.005; for
⇠ = 0.1 and ⇠ = 0.05 the perturbations are too large, and we
end up converging with relatively high regret (due to being
forced to play every action with probability ⇠). Thus, within
this set of ex eriments, ⇠ 2 [0.005, 0.01] seems to be the ideal
amount of perturbation.
5 Conclusion and future research
We studied the extension of FOMs to the computation of
Nash-equilibrium refinements. We developed a smoothing
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Figure 3: Maximum regret at any individual information set,
as a function of the number of iterations, for standard EGT
as well as with various ⇠ perturbations (denoted EGT(⇠)) and
CFR+. Both axes are on a log scale.
scheme based on perturbations of smoothing schemes for
standard EFG solving, and proved that the convergence rate
is comparable to that of solving the original game for Nash
equilibrium. We performed numerical simulations on 5-card
Leduc hold’em, where we showed that our approach has an
overall convergence rate that is comparable to that of state-of-
the-art methods such as EGT and CFR+ for Nash equilibrium.
At the same time, we showed that our approach leads to so-
lutions that have substantially better performance in subsets
of the game tree that are reached with low probability. This
has benefits both in approximate Nash equilibrium finding
(such approximation is necessary in practice in large games)
where some probabilities are low while possibly heading to-
ward zero in the limit, and exact Nash equilibrium computa-
tion where the low probabilities are actually zero.
Our work suggests several research directions. It would
be interesting to find a way to systematically decrease the ⇠-
perturbations over time, so that we eventually converge to an
exact Nash equilibrium in the full game. This requires at least
two extensions. First, FOMs usually assume static domains,
whereas this would involve a slowly expanding domain. Sec-
ond, the ⇠ would need to be decreased at a rate that is simul-
taneously fast enough that it converges at a reasonable rate,
and slow enough that we actually converge to a refinement.
We showed how to compute approximate EFPE refine-
ments using methods that scale to large games. It would be in-
teresting to find a way to instantiate scalable methods such as
FOMs or CFR+ for other equilibrium refinement concepts as
well. The perturbed polytope due to Miltersen and Sørensen
could be used to construct a notion of approximate QPE that
would lead to an optimization setup similar to ours. How-
ever, this will require constructing a DGF for the perturbed-
QPE polytope, which has ⇠-perturbations on the realization
plans. Our approach relied on ⇠-perturbations to the behav-
ioral strategies, and so it is likely that a different DGF class is
needed to handle approximate QPE.
Figure 3: Maximum regret at an l information set,
as a function of the number of iterati s, for standard EGT
as well as with various ⇠ perturbations (denoted EGT(⇠)) and
CFR+. Both axes are on a log scale.
5 Conclusion and future research
We studied the extension of FOMs to the computation of
Nash-equilibrium refinements. We developed a smoothing
scheme based on perturbations of smoothing schemes for
standard EFG solving, and proved that the convergence rate
is comparable to that of solving the original game for Nash
equilibrium. We performed numerical simulations on 5-card
Leduc hold’em, where we showed that our approach has an
overall convergence rate that is comparable to that of state-of-
the-art methods such as EGT and CFR+ for Nash equilibrium.
At the same time, we showed that our approach leads to so-
lutions that have substantially better performance in subsets
of the game tree that are reached with low probability. This
has benefits both in approximate Nash equilibrium finding
(such approximation is necessary in practice in large games)
where some probabilities are low while possibly heading to-
ward zero in the limit, and exact Nash equilibrium computa-
tion where the low probabilities are actually zero.
Our work suggests several research directions. It would
be interesting to find a way to systematically decrease the ⇠-
perturbations over time, so that we eventually converge to an
exact Nash equilibrium in the full game. This requires at least
two extensions. First, FOMs usually assume static domains,
whereas this would involve a slowly expanding domain. Sec-
ond, the ⇠ would need to be decreased at a rate that is simul-
taneously fast enough that it converges at a reasonable rate,
and slow enough that we actually converge to a refinement.
We showed how to compute approxi ate EFPE refine-
ments using methods that scale to large g m s. It w uld be in-
teresting to find a way to instantiate scalabl thods such as
FOMs or CFR+ for other equilibrium refinement concepts as
well. The perturbed polytope due to Milte sen and Sørensen
could be used to construct a notion of approximate QPE that
would lead to an optimization setup similar to ours. How-
ever, this will require constructing a DGF for the perturbed-
QPE polytope, which has ⇠-perturbations on the realization
plans. Our approach relied on ⇠-perturbations to the behav-
ioral strategies, and so it is likely that a different DGF class is
needed to handle approximate QPE.
Figure 2: Regret as a function of th r of iterations for EGT
with various ξ perturba ions (denote in parentheses) and CFR+.
Both axes are on log cale.
traversals performed per algorithm1. The y-axis shows the
sum of player reg ets in the full (unperturbed) game. We
find that ξ p rturbatio s have almost no effect on over-
all convergence rate until conve gence withi the perturbed
olytope, at which point he regret in the unperturbed game
stops d c easi g, as expected. This show that our approach
can b utilize in prac ic : there is no substantial loss of con-
vergence rate. Later in the run o the perturbed algorithms
have bottomed out, there is a tradeoff between exploitability
in the full ga e and refin m nt (i.e., better performance in
low-p obabil ty information sets).
The second experiment shows a measure of refinement
convergence (Figure 3). The x-axis shows the number of tree
traversals performed. The y-axis shows the maximum regret
at any individual information set. Information set regret is
calculated assuming that the infor ation set is reached with
probability one and applying Bayes’ rule to get a distribution
over nodes at the information set; t regret is the increase
in exp cted ut lity from b st-responding throughout all infor-
mation sets in the subtrees root d at t info mati n set. Both
CFR+ and unperturbed EGT perform badly with respect to
this measure of refinement. Both have maxi um regret two
orders of magnitude worse than the perturbed approach. The
maximum regret one can possibly cause in an information
set in Leduc 5 is 22, so CFR+ and unperturbed EGT also do
poorly in that sense. In contrast to this, we find that our ξ-
perturbed solution concepts converge to a strategy with low
regret at every information set. The choice of ξ is impor-
tant: for ξ = 0.001, the smallest perturbati n, we see that it
take a ong time to converg a low-probability information
sets, wh reas e converge reasonably quickly for ξ = 0.01
or ξ = 0.005; for ξ = 0.1 and ξ = 0.05 the perturbations
are too large, and we end up converging with relatively high
regret (due to being forced to play every action with probabil-
ity ξ). Thus, within this set of experiments, ξ ∈ [0.005, 0.01]
seems to be the ideal amount of perturbation.
1Game tree traversals are equally expensive for all the algorithms
studied. Treeplex traversal for each player is slower in EGT than
CFR due to requiring exponentiation exp( · ), but the algorithms
spend significantly less time on treeplex traversals than tree traver-
sals, so this difference between the algorithms is insignificant.
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Figure 2: Regret s a functi n of the number of iterations for
EGT with various ⇠ pe turbations (denoted in parentheses)
and CFR+. The y-axis is on log scale.
player regr ts in the full (unperturbed) game. We find that
he ⇠ perturbations h ve almost no effect on overall conver-
gence rate until converg nce within the perturbed olytope, at
which point the regret in the unperturbed gam stops decreas-
ing, as expected. This shows that our approach can be utilized
in practice: there is no substantial loss of convergence rate.
Later in the run once the perturbed algorithms have bottomed
out, there is a tradeoff between exploitability in the full game
and refinement (i.e., better performance in low-probability in-
formation sets).
The second experiment shows a measure of refinement
convergence (Figure 3). The x-axis shows the number of
tree traversals performed per algorithm. The y-axis shows the
maximum regret at any individual information set. Informa-
tio s t regret is calculated assuming that the i f r ation set
is ached with probability one and applying B yes rule to get
a d stribution over nodes at the infor ation set; the r gret is
the incr ase in xpec ed utility from best-responding through-
out all information sets in the subtrees rooted at the informa-
tion set. Both CFR+ and unperturbed EGT perform badly
with respect to this measure of refinement. Both have maxi-
mum regret two orders of magnitude worse than the perturbed
approach. The maximum regret one can possibly cause in an
information set in Leduc 5 is 22, so CFR+ and unperturbed
EGT also do poorly in that sense.
In contrast to this, we find that our ⇠-perturbed solution
concepts converge to a strateg with low regret at every infor-
mation set. The choice of ⇠ is im ortant: for ⇠ = 0.001, the
smalles p rturbation, we see hat it takes a long time to con-
v rge at low-probability information sets, whereas we con-
verge reasonably quickly for ⇠ = 0.01 or ⇠ = 0.005; for
⇠ = 0.1 and ⇠ = 0.05 the perturbations ar too large, and we
end up converging with relatively high regret (due t being
forced to play every action with p obability ⇠). Thus, within
this set of experim nts, ⇠ 2 [0.005, 0.01] seems to be the ideal
amount of perturbation.
5 Conclusion and future research
We studied the extension of FOMs to the computation of
Nash-equilibrium refinement . We developed a smoothing
0 1 · 105 2 · 105 3 · 105 4 · 105
0.1
1
10 CFR+
EGT(0)
EGT(0.1)
EGT(0.05)
EGT(0.001)
EGT(0.01)
EGT(0.005)
CFR
Number of tree traversals
M
ax
in
fo
rm
at
io
n
se
tr
eg
re
t
Leduc5
Figure 3: Maximum regret at any individual information set,
as a function of the number of iterations, for standard EGT
as well as with various ⇠ perturbations (denoted EGT(⇠)) and
CFR+. Both axes are on a log scale.
scheme based on perturbations of smoothing schemes for
stan ar EFG solving, and proved that the convergence rate
is comparable to that of solving th original ga e for Nash
equili rium. We performed numerical simulations on 5-card
Leduc hold’em, where we showed that our approa h has an
overall convergence rate that is comparable to that f st te-of-
the-art ethods such as EGT and CFR+ for Nash equilib ium.
At t e same time, we showed that our approach lead to so-
lutions that hav substant ally better p rformance in subsets
of he game tree that are reached with low probability. This
has ben fits both in approximate Nash equilibrium finding
(such approximation is necessary in practice in large games)
where so e probabiliti s ar lo while ossibly heading to-
ward zero in the limit, and exact Nash equilibrium computa-
tion where the l w probabilities are ally ze o.
Our work suggests sev ral research dir ctions. It would
be intere tin to find a way to sy temat cally de rease he ⇠-
perturba ions ove time, s th t we eventually conv rge to an
exact Nash equilibrium in the full game. This requires at least
two x ensions. First, FOM usually assum static domains,
whereas this would inv lve a slowly expanding domain. Sec-
ond, the ⇠ would need to be decreased at a rate that is simul-
taneou ly fast enough that it converges at a reasonable rate,
and low en gh that we actuall converge to a refinement.
We sh wed how to compute approximate EFPE refine-
ments using methods that s ale to large g mes. It would be in-
teresting to find way to instantiate scalable methods such as
FOMs or CFR+ for other equilibrium refinement concepts as
well. The perturbed polytope due to Miltersen and Sørensen
could be used to construct a notion of approximate QPE that
would lead to an ptimization setup similar to ours. How-
ev r, this will require constr cting DGF for the p rturbed-
QPE polytope, which has ⇠-perturbations on the realization
plans. Our app oach relied on ⇠-perturbati ns to the behav-
ioral strategies, and so it is likely that a different DGF class is
needed to handle approximate QPE.
Figure 3: Maximum regret at any individual infor t, as a
function of the number of iterations.
5 Conclusion and future research
We studied the extension of FOMs to the computation of
Nash-equilibrium refinements. We developed a smoothing
scheme based on perturbations of smoothing schemes for
standard EFG solving, and proved that the convergence rate
is comparabl to that of sol ing the origi l am for Nash
equilibrium. We performed numerical simulations where we
showed that our approach has an over ll convergence rate
that is comparabl to that of state-of-the-art Nas equilibrium
methods. At the same time, we showed that our approach
leads to solutions that have substantially better performance
in subsets of the game tree that are reached with low prob-
ability. This has benefits both in approximate Nash equilib-
rium finding (such approximation is necessary in practice in
large games) where some probabilities are low while possibly
heading toward zero in the limit, and exact Nash equilibrium
computation where the low probabilities are actually zero.
Our work suggests several research directions. It would
be interesting to find a w y to syste atically decrease the ξ-
pertu bations over time, s tha we eventually converge to an
xact N h equilibrium in the full game. This r quires at least
two extensions. First, FOMs usu lly ssume static do ains,
whereas this would involve a slowly expanding domain. Sec-
ond, the ξ would need to be decreased at a rate that is simul-
taneously fast enough that it converges at a reasonable rate,
and slo enough that we actually converge to a refinement.
We showed how to compute approximate EFPE refine-
ments using methods that scale to large ga es. It would be in-
teresting to find a way to instantiate scalable methods such as
FOMs or CFR+ f r other equilibrium refineme t concepts as
well. The perturbed polytope due to Miltersen and Sørensen
could be used to construct a notion of appr ximate QPE that
would lead to an opt mization setup similar ours. How-
eve , this will require constructing a DGF for the perturbed-
QPE polytope, which has ξ-perturbations on t r alization
plans. Our pproach relied on ξ-perturbations to the behav-
ioral str tegi s, and so it is likely that a different DGF class is
needed to handle approximate QPE.
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